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ABSTRACT
Drones have created a new threat to people’s privacy. We
are now in an era in which anyone with a drone equipped
with a video camera can use it to invade a subject’s privacy
by streaming the subject in his/her private space over an
encrypted first person view (FPV) channel. Although many
methods have been suggested to detect nearby drones, they all
suffer from the same shortcoming: they cannot identify exactly
what is being captured, and therefore they fail to distinguish
between the legitimate use of a drone (for example, to use a
drone to film a selfie from the air ) and illegitimate use that
invades someone’s privacy (when the same operator uses the
drone to stream the view into the window of his neighbor’s
apartment), a distinction that in some cases depends on the
orientation of the drone’s video camera rather than on the
drone’s location. In this paper we shatter the commonly held
belief that the use of encryption to secure an FPV channel
prevents an interceptor from extracting the POI that is being
streamed. We show methods that leverage physical stimuli to
detect whether the drone’s camera is directed towards a target
in real time. We investigate the influence of changing pixels on
the FPV channel (in a lab setup). Based on our observations
we demonstrate how an interceptor can perform a side-channel
attack to detect whether a target is being streamed by analyzing
the encrypted FPV channel that is transmitted from a real
drone (DJI Mavic) in two use cases: when the target is a private
house and when the target is a subject.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of consumer drones over the last few years
[1] has created a new privacy threat. We are living in an era in
which anyone with a drone equipped with a video camera can
invade another individual’s privacy by maneuvering the drone
to the individual’s house and directing the drone’s camera to
the window of the house in order to film or record the subject
in his/her private space. Many privacy invasion incidents have
been reported in the media, and laws are being updated to deal
with this new threat [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8].
State of the art drones provide video piloting capabilities,
a.k.a. first person view (FPV), a communication channel
designed to (1) stream the video captured by the drone’s video
camera to the operator’s controller in order to present the video
stream to the operator in real-time, and (2) maneuver the drone
by transmitting commands from the controller to the drone.
FPV provides excellent infrastructure for a malicious operator
to invade someone’s privacy without being detected because:
(1) it eliminates the need for a malicious operator to be close
to the drone or target by allowing the operator to maneuver
the drone from far away to a target that is also far away from
his/her location, (2) its traffic can be encrypted, and (3) it
supports HD resolutions that enable the attacker to obtain high
resolution images and close-ups (by using the video camera’s
zooming capabilities) that are captured by the drone far from
the target POI.
Extracting a target POI from an FPV channel has interested
researchers for a long time. Many studies have suggested
methods for detecting whether a drone is nearby, however
none of them can detect exactly what is being captured, and
therefore they fail to distinguish between the legitimate use of
the drone (e.g., to film a selfie from the air) and illegitimate
use (e.g., to stream the view into the window of someone
else’s apartment), a distinction that in some cases depends on
the orientation of the drone’s video camera rather than on the
drone’s location. There are many known cases in which a POI
was extracted from an unencrypted video stream [9], [10],
[11], [12], however detecting a target POI from an encrypted
video stream remains a challenge.
In this research we shatter the commonly held belief that the
use of encryption to secure a surveillance video channel trans-
mitting in real-time prevents an interceptor from extracting
the POI that is being tracked by a drone. We present different
methods that can be used by an interceptor to detect whether a
particular POI (e.g., his/her house, a subject) is being tracked
by a drone, even if the FPV channel is encrypted; in order
to accomplish this, our proposed methods trigger a physical
stimulus that influences the encrypted FPV channel, and can
be used by an interceptor to detect if a specific POI is being
tracked. We investigate the influence of changing pixels on
the FPV channel in a lab setup. Based on our observations we
demonstrate how an interceptor can perform a side-channel
attack to detect whether a target is being streamed by analyzing
the encrypted FPV channel that is transmitted from a real
drone (DJI Mavic) in two use cases: when the target is a
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2private house and when the target is a subject. We investigate
the amount of time that the physical stimulus must be activated
in order to achieve an FPR of zero in each of the use cases.
A. Motivation
Interest in intercepting a drone’s traffic in order to extract the
captured POI from an FPV channel is not limited to civilians;
there are many known cases in which a military organiza-
tion has successfully intercepted an unencrypted surveillance
camera’s video stream transmitted from a rival’s drone and
managed to identify the POI that was under surveillance
[9], [10], [11], [12]. Just recently, the Israel Defense Forces
confirmed that 12 soldiers were killed in 1997 as a result
of intercepted intelligence that was transmitted from an Is-
raeli surveillance drone over an unencrypted channel, giving
Hezbollah advance knowledge of a naval commando operation
deep inside Lebanon [13], [14]. However, to the best of our
knowledge, there are no known cases in which interceptors
were able to extract a POI from an encrypted FPV channel.
B. Contributions
This study makes the following contributions:
• Extraction of a POI from an encrypted FPV channel
- We are the first to demonstrate a method that extracts a
targeted POI from an encrypted FPV channel and can
be used to distinguish between the legitimate use of
a drone that does not invade a subject’s privacy and
illegitimate use; a difference that depends on the angle
of the video camera and not on the location of the drone,
as demonstrated in Figure 2.
• External Interception Model - Other studies [15], [16],
[17] that aimed to classify video streams sent from a
VOD supplier (e.g., Netflix, YouTube, etc.) to a client
over the Internet used traffic that was captured from
the client’s network. This setup raises two problems: (1)
in real life, in order to capture traffic from a targeted
network, a computer inside the targeted network must be
infected with a malware, and (2) most of these studies
claim that their model works using external network
interception. There are major challenges that arise when
using an external interception model (e.g., packet loss),
and their models’ robustness to such challenges is unclear.
Our study presents an external interception model using
a radio frequency (RF) scanner that was empirically
evaluated outside a lab setup and does not require any
network infection.
• Effective for Encrypted Traffic - Our methods work by
analyzing encrypted traffic without any prior knowledge
regarding the cryptography algorithm that is being used.
We only use the length of the cryptogram which can be
extracted from the second layer of the OSI model instead
of its higher levels which were used in other studies [15],
[16] to classify video streams.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: in Section
II we discuss various protocols and coding algorithms for
video streams. In Section III we review related works from
two main areas: information leakage from video streams and
known methods of detecting nearby drones. In Section IV we
present (1) an adversarial model of an attacker that performs a
privacy invasion attack, and (2) an external interception model
for the detection of a captured POI. In Section V we investigate
the influence of changing pixels on the transmitted traffic (in
a lab setup), and in Section VIII we discuss legal solutions for
privacy invasion attacks.
II. BACKGROUND
Modern drones provide video piloting capabilities (FPV
channel), in which a live video stream is sent from the drone
to the pilot (operator) on the ground so the pilot is flying
the drone as if he/she was onboard instead of looking at the
drone from the pilotâA˘Z´s actual ground position. It allows an
operator to control a drone using a remote controller. There
are three types of technologies dominating the FPV market:
Wi-Fi FPV and analog FPV. Wi-Fi FPV is, by far, the most
popular method used to include FPV in budget RC drones
because: (1) any Android/iOS smartphone (or tablet) on the
market can be used to operate the drone, and (2) the additional
hardware required includes only a Wi-Fi FPV transmitter (that
is connected to the camera of the drone), instead of the
dedicated radio transmitter and dedicated controller required
by other FPV types (e.g., 5.8GHz Analog FPV and 2.4GHz
Analog FPV). Almost every FPV-enabled drone selling for
less than $100 uses Wi-Fi FPV [18]; in addition, there are
dozens of kinds of Wi-Fi FPV drones available for purchase
[19], [20], [21] and their price varies from $30 for a simple
drone up to hundreds of dollars for a professional drone (DJI
Mavic, DJI Spark, Parrot Bebop 2) with HD resolutions (up to
4K) and extended functionality (e.g., follow me, return home,
etc.).
Wi-Fi communication between the controller and the drone
is sent over a secured access point that is opened by either
the drone or the controller (both parties are connected to the
access point). Using dedicated hardware (e.g., a controller with
a Wi-Fi signal range extender), current drone models provide
operators the ability to control a drone using FPV from a
distance of a few kilometers over Wi-Fi channels [22], [23],
[24].
The video that is captured by the drone camera is streamed
to its controller using real-time end-to-end media stream-
ing protocols (RTP). The RTP standard describes two sub-
protocols: RTP (Real-Time Transport Protocol) and RTCP
(RTP Control Protocol). RTP is used to transport media, and
the majority of its implementations are built on the user data-
gram protocol (UDP), since real-time multimedia streaming
applications require timely delivery of information and can
often tolerate some packet loss to achieve this goal. RTCP
transports statistics for a media connection and information
such as the transmitted octet and packet counts, packet loss,
packet delay variation, and round-trip delay time. RTP and
RTCP each have a secured version SRTP and SRTCP which
are intended to provide encryption, message authentication and
integrity, and replay protection. RTSP is a network control
protocol designed for use in entertainment and communication
3systems to control streaming media servers. The protocol is
used for establishing and controlling media sessions between
end points, and it supports a transmission of commands, such
as play, record, and pause.
A. Video Coding Algorithms
Video encoding [25], [26], [27] begins with a raw image
captured from a camera. The camera converts analog signals
generated from striking photons into a digital image format.
Video is simply a series of such images generally captured
five to 120 times per second (referred to as frames per second
or FPS). The stream of raw digital data is then processed by a
video encoder in order to decrease the amount of traffic that is
required to transmit a video stream. Video encoders use two
techniques to compress a video: intra-frame coding (spatial
compression) and inter-frame coding (temporal compression).
Intra-frame coding creates an I-Frame, a time periodic
reference frame that is strictly intra-coded. The receiver de-
codes an I-frame without additional information. Intra-frame
prediction exploits spatial redundancy, i.e., correlation among
pixels within one frame, by calculating prediction values
through extrapolation from already coded pixels for effective
delta coding. The intra-coding process contains the following
stages [28], [27]:
1) Color conversion and chroma sub-sampling - The human
eye has a lower sensitivity to color information than
to dark-bright contrasts. First a conversion from RGB
color space into YUV color components (e.g., YCbCr) is
applied, and then, some of the chrominance information
of the image is removed. This is a lossy stage.
2) Partition - The actual frame is divided into non overlap-
ping macroblocks.
3) Transformation - A block is represented in the frequency
domain.
4) Quantization - This process is applied to the block
to remove the insignificant part (high frequencies) and
results in a compressed block with a smaller amount of
information. This is a lossy stage.
5) Entropy coding - Compression algorithms are used to
represent the data by mapping frequently occurring
patterns with a few bits and rarely occurring patterns
with many bits (e.g., using Huffman coding).
Over the years various optimizations have been introduced
for each of the stages, including: (1) dynamic partitioning
techniques, (2) novel prediction algorithms and varying the
amount of reference frames, (3) different domain transforma-
tions, and (4) quantization methods. These optimizations boost
the transmission rate from 1.5 Mbps (MPEG-1) to 150 Mbps
(MPEG-4).
Inter-frame coding exploits temporal redundancy by using
a buffer of neighboring frames that contains the last M number
of frames and creates a delta frame. A delta frame is a
description of a frame as a delta of another frame in the buffer.
The receiver decodes a delta frame using a received reference
frame. There are two major types of delta frames: P-Frame
and B-Frame. P-Frames can use data from previous frames
Fig. 1. GOP structure - I,B, and P-frames
to decompress and are more compressible than I-Frames. B-
Frames can use both previous and upcoming frames for data
reference to get the greatest amount of data compression. The
process of generating a delta frame consists of the following
stages:
1) Partition - dividing the actual frame into nonoverlapping
macroblocks.
2) Reference block matching - finding a similar block in
another frame.
3) Motion vector extraction - extracting the difference
between the two blocks by calculating the prediction
error.
The order in which I, B, and P-Frames are arranged is
specified by a GOP (group of pictures) structure. A GOP is a
collection of successive pictures within a coded video stream.
It usually consists of two I-Frames, one at the beginning and
one at the end. In the middle of the GOP structure, P and
B-Frames are ordered periodically. An example of a GOP
structure, with I, P, and B-Frames, can be seen in Figure 1.
Occasionally B-Frames are not used in real-time streaming
due to delays.
Intra-framing and inter-framing techniques were integrated
into the MPEG-1 standard in the 1990s. Naturally, integrating
these techniques into the protocol creates a variable bitrate
(VBR) in the transmission of a video which is influenced
by changes between frames and the content of the frame
itself. A frame that can be represented as a set of prediction
blocks of a similar neighboring frame (that has already been
captured and transmitted) requires a smaller amount of data
to be represented. The same thing is also true for video
streams with a lot of redundancy in their frames. On the
other hand, a frame with less similarity to other neighboring
frames (e.g., as a result of the movement of several objects)
necessitates that a larger amount of data be represented as a
set of prediction blocks of other frames. The same thing is
also true for a frame with less redundancy. Even if the video
stream is encrypted at the transport layer (e.g., using TLS), the
sizes of the packets and times of arrival are visible to anyone
watching the network. In terms of cyber security such coupling
between the captured stream and its cryptogram series can be
used to extract meaningful information, as described below in
Section III.
III. RELATED WORK
In this section we describe: (1) methods that exploit in-
formation leakage of an encrypted video stream to extract
insights about the stream, and (2) methods for nearby drone
4Fig. 2. From left to right: (a) a drone boxed in red, two people boxed in blue, and a window of an organization boxed in yellow, (b) illegitimate use of the
drone camera - filming the organization, (c) a legitimate use for selfie purposes.
detection. In the area of video hosting services, several studies
exploited video stream information leakage to classify a video
stream sent from a video hosting service (e.g., YouTube,
Netflix, etc.) using Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP
(DASH) protocols (a.k.a. MPEG-DASH). This attack model
relies on two steps: (A) building a database of reference
traces of video streams, and (B) classifying a query trace of
an intercepted video stream by matching it to the database.
Saponas et al. [15] analyzed Slingbox’s encrypted streams
sent over wired and wireless connections to a client installed
on a computer and managed to achieve a 89% accuracy in
classifying 26 different movies by analyzing 40 minutes of the
stream’s bitrate. Schuster et al. [17] classified video streams
sent from Netflix, Amazon, YouTube, and Vimeo by analyzing
burst patterns using convolutional neural networks. Reed et
al. [29], [30] classified Netflix’s video streams and reached
accuracy over 90% by analyzing only eight minutes of the
stream. In an area similar to video hosting services, Liu et al.
[16] constructed robust video signatures using wavelet based
analysis by analyzing traffic sent over the RTP of an IPTV. In
the area of VoIP, Wright et al. showed that VBR leakage in
encrypted VoIP communication can be used for the detection
of the speaker’s language [31] and phrases [32]. White et al.
[33] extended this approach to extract conversation transcripts.
Wampler et al. [34] analyzed packets’ average inter-arrival
time, size, and bandwidth, and the number of received packets
in a window, in order to extract hand movement and ambient
light changes from IP camera traffic sent over RTP.
In terms of the attack model, the described studies did
not conduct their experiments using an external RF scanner
(e.g., NIC in monitor mode), so their attack model requires a
malware installed on the targeted network/computer in order
to detect the video streams.
In the area of drone detection, various methods were
introduced over the last few years to detect a nearby drone.
Radar is a traditional method of detecting drones, however
the detection of small consumer drones requires expensive
high-frequency radar systems [35]. Several studies suggested
computer vision techniques to detect a drone by using a
camera to analyze motion cues [36], [37]. However, these
methods suffer from false positive detections due to: (1) the
TABLE I
INFORMATION LEAKAGE FROM VBR - RELATED WORK
Transmitter Purpose Publication Required.o’
Analyzed
Protocols Interception
Video Hosting
Services (Netflix,
YouTube, etc.)
Classify
Video-stream
[15] - USENIX 2007
[16] -
[17] - USENIX 2017
[30] - CODASPY 2017
[29] - CCNC 2016
Minutes DASH Internal
IPTV ClassifyVideo-stream [42] - GLOBECOM 2008 Minutes RTP Internal
IP Camera Lights on/off,Hand movement [34] - GLOBECOM 2015 Immediate RTP Internal
PC
Language extraction[31]
Phrase detection[32]
Transcripts[33]
[31] - USENIX 2007
[32] - S&P 2008
[33] - S&P 2011
- VoIP Internal
Drone Detecting Streamed POI - 10 seconds RTP External
increasing number of drone models, and (2) the similarities
between the movements of drones and birds [37]. In order
to distinguish between birds and drones, several approaches
analyzed the noise of the rotors captured by microphones
[38], [37]. However, very expensive equipment is required
in order to address the challenges arising from the ambient
noise and the distance between the drone and the microphone
[38]. A hybrid method that combines all of the methods
discussed in this section was suggested by [39] in order to
improve the accuracy of detection, however such a method
is very expensive to deploy. Two other studies proposed a
method to detect a consumer/civilian drone controlled using
Wi-Fi signals. The first method [40] analyzes the protocol’s
signatures of the Wi-Fi connection between the drone and
its controller. The second method [41] analyzes the received
signal strength (RSS) using a RF scanner (e.g., Wi-Fi receiver).
None of the described methods for drone detection is able
to determine whether the drone was used to invade privacy (by
video recording the subject/target). More specifically, they are
unable to understand what exactly is being recorded by the
drone. In crowded areas, the difference between legitimate
and illegitimate use is based on the angle of the drone’s
camera. Figure 2 presents legitimate and illegitimate uses of
a drone. All of the described methods [35], [36], [37], [38],
[39], [40], [41] fail to distinguish between the act of taking a
selfie and a privacy invasion attack. In contrast, our method
does not have these abovementioned weakness. In this research
we demonstrate methods for: (1) determining exactly what is
being recorded, and (2) providing a subject with proof that
he/she was under surveillance.
5Fig. 3. Proposed target detection scheme.
IV. ADVERSARY MODEL & PROPOSED DETECTION
SCHEME
We consider an adversary operator that uses a drone to film
a target (subject or organization) for:
1) Self-entertainment - the attacker considers a privacy
invasion attack as a form of entertainment and performs
the attack to satisfy his/her curiosity.
2) Malicious purpose - the attacker uses the drone’s video
camera to collect information about the target for ma-
licious purposes. For example, in cases in which the
target is an organization, the malicious purpose can be
to break into an organization (the drone can be used to
count the number of subjects that leave the building).
Another malicious purpose is using the drone to disable
a secret facility (in which the captured video is used
to map the organizational assets). In cases in which the
target is a subject, the purpose can be to understand
whether the subject is cheating on his/her spouse by
using the drone’s video camera to spy on the subject (as
was shown in [5]).
The interceptor’s goal is to determine whether a target is
being captured by a drone’s video camera. We assume that an
interceptor has detected the presence of a drone nearby (using
one of the known methods for drone detection [35], [36], [37],
[38], [39], [40], [41]) or by analyzing suspicious access points.
In addition we assume that the interceptor owns an RF scanner
(e.g., an NIC) that is connected to a computer with an adequate
antenna that captures the traffic being sent from the drone
to the controller. The interceptor initiates a physical stimulus
aimed at the captured target in a random pattern and analyzes
the intercepted traffic in a detection model. Figure 3 presents
the proposed target detection scheme and the parties involved.
A. Detection Model
Algorithm 1 presents the target detection model. It receives
as input: (1) the intercepted Wi-Fi stream (that was captured
by the NIC), (2) a watermarking pattern (binary sequence) that
was modulated by the physical stimulus, and (3) a window for
each bit that was modulated. In addition, the algorithm receives
the (4) start and (5) end time of the watermarked pattern
(in epoch representation). First, the intercepted Wi-Fi traffic
is converted to a bitrate array (line 3). A stableInterval is
extracted for the following time period: four seconds before the
first physical stimulus begins until the next physical stimulus
starts (line 5). A stimulusInterval is extracted for the
following time period: for four seconds from the time at which
the first physical stimulus begins (line 6). A stableBitrate and
stimulusBitrate are calculated by averaging stableInterval
and stimulusInterval intervals (lines 8-9). A cutoff is
calculated as the middle between the stableInterval and
the stimulusBitrate (line 10). Each bit interval is extracted
from bitrateArray, classified as 0/1 bits and concatenated
to extractedPattern (lines 11-17). Finally, a Boolean re-
sult is returned by comparing the watermarkedPattern to
extractedPattern patterns(line 18).
Algorithm 1 Privacy Invasion Attack Detection
Input:
1) intercepted-WiFI-Stream // Intercepted by the NIC
2) watermarkingPattern // binary sequence (e.g., 101..01)
3) window // milliseconds for single bit modulating
4) beginPatternTime // begin time of pattern (epoch)
5) endPatternTime // end time of pattern (epoch)
Output:
Boolean result
1: procedure UNDERDETECTION?
2: extractedPattern← ""
3: bitrateArray = extractBitrateArray(intercepted-WiFI-Stream)
4: stableBeginTime = beginPatternTime - 4000
5: stableInterval = bitrateArray.subarray(stableBeginTime, beginPatternTime)
6: endStimulusTime = beginPatternTime + 4000
7: stimulusInterval = bitrateArray.subarray(beginStimulusTime,endStimulusTime)
8: stableBitrate = average(stableInterval)
9: stimulusBitrate = average(stimulusInterval)
10: cutoff = (stumulusBitrate+ stableBitrate)/2
11: for (i = beginPatternTime; i < endPatternTime; i = i+window)
do
12: interval = bitrateArray.subArray(i,i+window)
13: avg = average(interval)
14: if avg > cutoff then
15: result = result + "1"
16: else
17: result = result + "0"
18: return (watermarkingPattern == extractedPattern)
B. Intercepting FPV Channels
As was discussed in Section II, many commercial drones
provide FPV capabilities over Wi-Fi channels. In this case,
the drone/controller exposes a secured access point that both
parties connect to using authentication. The video stream
is sent over Wi-Fi communication and can be intercepted
using an NIC (in monitoring mode). An antenna can be
used by an interceptor in order to extend the interception
6range. DJI Mavic, DJI Spark, and Parrot Bebop 2 drones use
Wi-Fi Protected Access II (WPA2) protocols to secure their
networks. The access points of FPV channels can be detected
by changing the NIC mode of a laptop to monitoring mode
(or using a software defined radio instead) and using dedicated
tools (such as airmon, inSSIDer, etc.), that can even detect
hidden networks, in order to find suspicious access points.
After identifying suspicious access points, a specific access
point can be found by searching for known BSSIDs or MAC
IDs of drones. In situations in which the BSSIDs or MAC IDs
have been changed, the interceptor can use a method to detect
the type of drone by performing forensic analysis of the access
point communication as was suggested by Peacock et al. [40].
Another option is to analyze each of the access points within
range of the target in the detection model.
V. INFLUENCE OF PHYSICAL STIMULUS
In this section we investigate the influence of physical
stimuli (that change pixels in the streamed video) on the
transmitted traffic in a lab setup. All of the methods described
in this section make use of a simple principle that changes
in the number of pixels from a frame to a consecutive frame
requires data to encode, therefore changing a large number of
pixels results in more data to encode and causes the FPV’s
bitrate to increase (intra-frame coding). We show how the act
of flickering an object within a streamed video changes the
FPV’s bitrate and test the influence of dividing the flickering
object and changing its flickering colors.
A. Lab Experiments
In the preliminary lab experiments described below we
assess the influence of various changes to the pixels on the
traffic using a Mavic Pro [43] consumer drone. The drone
was configured to transmit video at a rate of 24 frames per
second (FPS), its default configuration. We used a laptop (Dell
Latitude 7480) that runs Kali Linux with a standard NIC (Intel
Dual-Band Wireless-AC 8265 Wi-Fi [44]) for interception. We
enabled the monitor mode on the NIC using airmon-ng [45]
and intercepted the encrypted video traffic of the Mavic’s AP.
The Mavic’s AP uses 802.11n to transfer the data between the
connected parties. From the external interception perspective,
we were able to extract only the second layer (data link layer)
meta-data which includes the following: BSSID, source MAC
address, destination MAC address, and packet length. The
payload of the packet is encrypted.
We started by analyzing the Mavic’s traffic when the
captured video is steady by placing the Mavic in front of
a white wall. Figure 4a shows the bitrate of the traffic that
was transmitted from the drone for a period of 240 seconds
and intercepted by a laptop’s NIC (in monitoring mode) at
1000 ms aggregation at three different resolutions and rates
(720p 30 FPS, 720p 60 FPS, and 2K 30 FPS). As can be seen
from the results in Figure 4, the bitrate is fairly stable for
each resolution over time, however higher resolutions generate
higher bitrates.
In the rest of the experiments described in this section,
we placed the Mavic in front of a laptop in order to expose
TABLE II
INFLUENCE OF CHANGING THE AMOUNT OF PIXELS ON THE TRAFFIC
Percentage of
changing pixels
0% 1.2% 2.50% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Bitrate (KB) 120 130 135 161 170 230 260 290 320
Delta Bitrate (KB) 0 10 15 41 50 110 140 170 200
Delta Bitrate (%) 0% 8% 13% 34% 42% 92% 117% 142% 167%
TABLE III
INFLUENCE OF DIVIDING AN AREA INTO PIECES ON THE TRAFFIC
Number of Pieces 1 2 4 8 16 32
Bitrate (KB) 250 260 275 300 325 340
Bitrate Delta (KB) 0 10 25 50 75 90
Bitrate Delta (%) 0.00% 4.00% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 36.00%
the drone to specific images/objects on the monitor. The
experimental setup is presented in Figure 5.
First, we investigated the effect of changing the percentage
of captured pixels on the traffic. We programed a Python code
to present a flickering rectangle on the screen in the middle
of the monitor. We tested the effect of various rectangle sizes
on the traffic that was sent from the drone to the controller
using external interception (the interception laptop was not
connected to an access point; its NIC was on monitor mode).
The rectangle flickered from white to black, and vice versa,
on a white background for 40 seconds.
As can be seen from the results presented in Table II,
there is a strong connection between the percentage of pixels
changed and the volume of traffic that was sent from the drone.
This phenomenon occurs because a larger amount of changing
pixels results in a larger amount of changing macroblocks.
A larger amount of changing macroblocks means that the
encoder must use more data to encode the delta frames; this in
turn increases the amount of traffic. In addition, as the results
show, very small changes (< 2.5%) are effectively absorbed
and merged with the background noise.
Next, we aimed to determine the effect of separating the
pixels and dividing them across several objects (rather than
centralizing them on one object) on the amount of traffic gen-
erated (given a fixed number of changed pixels). In this series
of experiments we fixed the amount of changing pixels but
presented a different number of rectangles, dividing the fixed
number of pixels to form smaller equal sized rectangles (2,
4, 8, 16, 32), and positioned the rectangles in different places
on the monitor. As can be seen from the results presented in
Table III, there is a strong connection between increasing the
number of rectangles and an increase in the amount of traffic
that is required to encode the change. We believe that this
phenomenon can be explained as follows: dividing a single
rectangle (which centralizes the fixed number of pixels) into
smaller pieces (thereby dividing the fixed number of pixels)
and separating them from each other on the monitor results in
the intersection with more macroblocks that change compared
to a centralized object of the same size. Therefore, this requires
more data to encode and increases the amount of traffic.
Finally, we assessed whether the objects’ position on the
7Fig. 4. Bitrate of captured Wi-Fi signals of the white wall at different resolutions
Fig. 5. Lab Setup - The DJI Mavic is placed in front of a laptop monitor.
A second laptop is used to intercept the traffic (using its NIC in monitoring
mode).
TABLE IV
INFLUENCE OF LOCATION OF AN OBJECT ON THE TRAFFIC
White Screen Top Left Top Right Bottom Left Bottom Left
Bitrate (KB) 120 195 195 195 195
Bitrate Delta (KB) 0 75 75 75 75
Bitrate Delta (%) 0.00% 62.500% 62.500% 62.500% 62.500%
monitor affects the traffic. In order to do this, we conducted
an experiment in which we flickered a rectangle that is one
fourth the size of the screen in four different places on the
monitor: top right, top left, bottom left, and bottom right. As
can be seen from the results presented in Table IV, each of
the flickering rectangles had the same effect on the traffic.
Therefore, we believe that when the objects’ size remains
fixed, the location on the monitor has no effect, since the same
number of changing macroblocks is involved.
From this set of experiments we were able to conclude that
(1) the larger the number of changed pixels, the greater the
influence on traffic (larger number of changing macroblocks),
and (2) the influence is even greater if the pixels are not
clustered together (intersection with a larger number of mac-
roblocks).
After investigating the effect of the number of pixels
changed, the objects’ location on the monitor, and the differ-
ence between keeping the pixels centralized vs. dividing them,
we moved on to assess the effect of the object’s color on the
amount of traffic. We conducted an experiment in which we
flickered different colored rectangles (black, green, blue, red,
TABLE V
INFLUENCE OF CHANGING THE COLOR OF AN OBJECT ON THE TRAFFIC
No flicker Black Red Green Orange Yellow Gray Purple Blue Pink
RGB Value
Bitrate (KB) 100 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325
Delta Bitrate (KB) 0 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225
Delta Bitrate (%) 0% 225% 225% 225% 225% 225% 225% 225% 225% 225%
TABLE VI
INFLUENCE OF BRIGHTNESS LEVEL OF AN OBJECT ON THE TRAFFIC
Brightness No flicker 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Bitrate (KB) 100 300 300 310 320 350
Bitrate Delta (KB) 0 200 200 210 220 250
Bitrate Delta (%) 0% 200% 200% 210% 220% 250%
orange, yellow, pink, purple, and white) of the same size on
the monitor.
As can be seen from results presented in Table VI, each
color caused the same effect on the amount of traffic that was
sent from the drone. From this experiment we can conclude
that no color significantly outperforms another.
Rather than using the RGB color space, video encoders
use different color spaces to represent a picture including:
YCbCr, YCoCg, etc. Video encoders transform a captured
picture from an RGB color space to a luma value (denoted as
Y) and two chroma values. The Y component can be stored
with a high resolution or transmitted at a high bandwidth,
and the two chroma components can be bandwidth-reduced,
subsampled, compressed, or otherwise treated separately for
improved system efficiency. Considering this information, we
then tested the effect of different brightness levels of the same
color on the traffic. To do so, we conducted an experiment in
which we flickered two colors (green and blue) at five different
brightness levels.
As can be seen from the results presented in Table VI,
increasing the level of brightness of the object increases the
amount of traffic sent from the drone to the controller. The
results obtained from the captured traffic were identical for
blue and green colors. From these results, we concluded that
brighter shades outperform darker shades of the same color.
In the next section we leverage our findings to detect privacy
invasion attacks targeting a private house and a subject.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section we present the evaluation for target detection
in two use cases: when the target is a private house and when
8the target is a subject.
A. Detecting a Privacy Invasion Attack Against a Building
In this subsection we demonstrate a method of securing a
building from privacy invasion attacks by triggering a physical
stimulus. As was shown in the lab experiments, flickering
objects influence the amount of traffic that is required to
encode the flickering objects. Taking this into consideration,
we show how a smart film (a.k.a. smart glass) can be used as
a means of triggering a physical stimulus in order to detect
whether a building is being tracked by a drone. We purchased
a smart film with an RF controller and attached it to a window
of a private house that we wanted to secure. The smart film
switches between two modes: transparent and white given a
radio command sent from its controller.
We wrote a simple Python program that uses a software
defined radio (HackRF) to modulate a given signal using on-
off keying (OOK) modulation. Each bit of the signal was
modulated using a window of two seconds. For 1 bits we
flickered the smart film, and for 0 bits we switched the smart
film so it was transparent for the entire period of time. We
randomly selected the sequence 111100001111111000000 as
a signal to be modulated using the physical stimulus.
In order to demonstrate an illegitimate use of the drone, we
asked an operator to fly the DJI Mavic and film his neighbor’s
garden and private house from the operator’s property. The
default resolution and FPS were used (720p and 24 FPS).
We purchased a parabolic antenna, TP-Link TL-ANT2424B
2.4GHz 24dBi Grid Parabolic, and connected it to a laptop to
intercept the drone’s outgoing traffic sent over the access point.
We ran our Python code to create a physical stimulus using the
smart film. Figure 6 presents two snapshots that were taken
from the streamed video and the results of applying Algorithm
1 to the intercepted traffic. The peaks in the bitrate correlate
to the time at which the smart film was flickered. The flicker
that was used to modulate the 1 bits increased the bitrate up
to 1.5-2 times, from an average of 300-350 KB to 450-570
KB. As can be seen from the intercepted traffic, the flicker
that was produced using the smart film influenced the bitrate
in a way that watermarked the bitrate according to the given
pattern that was programmed in the Python code.
In order to prove that the physical stimulus is the cause of
the traffic change, we conducted another experiment in which
we streamed the same house for 20 minutes without initiating
a physical stimulus. In addition, in order to prove that this
effect could not be reproduced with another house (that is
not the target), we streamed another house (the neighbor’s
house) for 20 minutes. In both cases we intercepted the traffic
using the same experimental setup. We applied Algorithm
1 to the intercepted traffic and calculated the false positive
rate as a function of the duration of the physical stimulus
for the original signal 111100001111111000000. As can be
seen from the results that are presented in Table VII, a pattern
of 10 seconds is sufficient to exclude detection mistakes of
filming another target (with an FPR of 0.032). In addition, a
pattern of 10 seconds is sufficient to exclude mistakes of the
same generated pattern without any physical stimulus that are
Fig. 6. A smart film controlled via a HackRF connected to a laptop.
TABLE VII
FPR BASED ON APPLYING ALGORITHM 1 ON THE SAME HOUSE WITHOUT
PHYSICAL STIMULUS AND ANOTHER HOUSE
Duration
of
Stimulus
(in
seconds)
Target’s house
without stimu-
lus
Neighbor’s
house
2 0.480 0.535
4 0.294 0.294
6 0.202 0.200
8 0.154 0.145
10 0.027 0.032
12 0.015 0.017
14 0.008 0.011
16 0.003 0.006
18 0.000 0.002
20 0.000 0.002
22 0.000 0.002
24 0.000 0.001
26 0.000 0.001
28 0.000 0.001
30 0.000 0.001
32 0.000 0.000
34 0.000 0.000
36 0.000 0.000
coincidental and the result of wind or other physical movement
(with an FPR of 0.027). Figure 7 presents a FPR graph as a
function of the duration of the physical stimulus.
B. Detecting a Privacy Invasion Attack Against a Subject
In this section we demonstrate a method to secure a subject
from a privacy invasion attack using a physical stimulus. We
show how a cyber-shirt can be used as a means of triggering a
physical stimulus in order to detect whether a subject is being
tracked by a drone. We connected a LED strip to a microcon-
9Fig. 7. A graph of the FPR as a function of the duration of the physical
stimulus.
Fig. 8. Cyber-shirt experiment
troller (Arduino Uno) and attached them both to a white shirt
to create a cyber-shirt. We programmed the micorocontroller
to modulate the pattern 01010011 01001111 01010011 (SOS
in ASCII) using the LED strip as a light sequence (the physical
stimulus). Again, we used on-off keying to modulate the binary
sequence. Each bit was modulated using a window of five
seconds. For 1 bits we flickered the LED strip, and for 0 bits
we switched the LED strip off. A DJI Mavic was used by
an operator to record the person wearing the cyber-shirt. We
repeated the same experimental setups used in the previous
experiment. The video of the experiment was recorded by the
DJI Mavic.
Figure 8 presents the results of applying Algorithm 1 to
the intercepted traffic. The peaks in the bitrate correlate to the
time at which the LED strip was flickered. The flicker that was
used to modulate the 1 bits increased the bitrate by 3-4 times,
from an average of 20 KB to an average of 60-80 KB. As can
be seen in Figure 8c, the light sequence that was produced by
the LED strip influenced the bitrate in a way that watermarked
the bitrate to the given pattern that was programmed in the
TABLE VIII
FPR BASED ON APPLYING ALGORITHM 1 ON THE SAME SUBJECT
WITHOUT A PHYSICAL STIMULUS AND ANOTHER SUBJECT
Duration
of
Stimulus
(in
seconds)
The
Subject
without
Stimulus
Nearby
Area
5 0.233 0.220
10 0.066 0.067
15 0.032 0.035
20 0.026 0.022
25 0.008 0.003
30 0.007 0.001
35 0.005 0
40 0.001 0
45 0 0
microcontroller.
In order to prove that the physical stimulus is the cause
of the traffic change, we conducted one more experiment in
which we streamed the same subject for 20 minutes without
any physical stimulus conducted by the shirt. In addition, in
order to prove that this effect could not be reproduced by
another object nearby (that is not the target), we streamed the
area for 20 minutes. In both cases we intercepted the traffic
using the same experimental setup. We applied Algorithm
1 to the intercepted traffic and calculated the false positive
rate as a function of the duration of the physical stimulus
for the original signal 01010011 01001111 01010011. As can
be seen from the results presented in Table VIII, a pattern
of 10 seconds is sufficient for excluding detection errors that
occur when filming another target (with an FPR of 0.067). In
addition, a pattern of 10 seconds is sufficient for excluding
errors that are coincidental and the result of wind or other
physical movement (with an FPR of 0.066). The graph in
Figure 9 presents the FPR as a function of the duration of
the physical stimulus.
VII. COUNTERMEASURES
In this section we review countermeasures against privacy
invasion attacks and more specifically, discuss countermea-
sures that can be used against our methods. In recent years
several methods have been suggested to disable a drone.
Son et al. [46] presented a method to spoof the drone’s
gyroscope using ultrasound. Davidson et al. [47] spoofed the
drone’s downward camera using a laser and projector that was
projected on different surfaces. Luo et al. [48] showed different
methods for hijacking and disabling a drone: (1) using GPS
spoofing of no-fly zones, and during the return to home task,
and (2) FPV jamming of the video stream. Rodday et al. [49]
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stimulus.
showed techniques to hijack a $30,000 drone by replaying
maneuvering commands to the drone, and Kamkar et al. [50]
performed a deauthentication attack on a Parrot AR.Drone.
In order to evade detection by an interceptor that uses our
methods an attacker can use a drone equipped with two video
cameras that are directed at different angles. The first camera
will provide an FPV channel and be used by the operator for
maneuvering. The second camera will be positioned 180 ◦
from the first camera, and it will store the captured video to a
memory card and be used by the operator to film a target.
Using a drone with two cameras has a primary advantage
and disadvantage. The primary advantage is that the second
camera which is used for recording the target is immune to our
detection methods, so an interceptor won’t be able to detect the
target POI by initiating a physical stimulus. However, using
different cameras for maneuvering and for recording results
in blind/semi-blind recording. Therefore the operator won’t
have total control of the specific object that is being recorded,
because the FPV channel only streams the video from the first
camera which is not directed at the target. Another method that
can be used by an operator to evade detection is redundancy. In
this case, the operator can program the drone to generate traffic
at a fixed bitrate. This can be done by transmitting the raw
data (instead of delta frames) that is captured by the camera
at a low quality. Another option for implementing a fixed
bitrate approach is to encode the captured data using delta-
frames (in order to support high resolutions) and compensate
for the difference in the bitrate between the B and P frames
to the I-Frames with additional mock encrypted packets that
will be sent from the drone in order and be discarded by the
receiver. However, the main disadvantage of this method is
that calculating the required volume of mock traffic to be sent
will cause delays to the FPV channel.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this research we demonstrated methods that can be
used to detect whether an object has been captured and is
being streamed from a drone camera to its controller. While
many methods have been suggested in recent years to detect
the presence of a nearby drone, this research is the first to
introduce methods that distinguish between the legitimate and
illegitimate (for purposes of privacy invasion) use of a nearby
drone. These days, consumer drones are used to conduct
privacy invasion attacks throughout the world, however no
tool currently exists for showing that a specific drone is being
used to stream a target. Perhaps in the future, legislation will
consider a watermarked PCAP as evidence, opening up new
opportunities for implementing our methods in a system or
service.
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